In order to better understand how concepts might be represented in the brain, we used a cross-modal conceptual priming paradigm to examine how repetition-related activity changes in the brain are related to conceptual priming. During scanning, subjects made natural/manmade judgments on a continuous stream of spoken nouns, written nouns and pictures of objects. Each stimulus either repeated in the same or a different modality with 1-4 intervening trials between repetitions. Behaviorally, participants showed significant perceptual and conceptual priming effects. The fMRI data showed that the conditions associated with the greatest behavioral priming exhibited the largest decreases in BOLD activity in left perirhinal cortex (PRc), as well as a few other regions. Furthermore, the PRc was the only region to show this relationship for the cross-modal conditions alone, where the concept but not the percept repeated. Conversely, repetition-related increases in PRc activity predicted better subsequent memory as assessed by a post-scan recognition test. These results suggest that repetition-related activity changes in the PRc are related both to the speed of access to a repeated concept and to that concept's later memorability.
Introduction
The human brain has a remarkable ability to support internal representations of concepts irrespective of the modality of the perceptual sensory input. For example, the presentation of the word "guitar" can generate the same internal representation whether it was presented visually or aurally. Furthermore, conceptual representations are themselves multi-modal in the sense that we know not only what a guitar looks like, but also what it sounds like and what it feels like to hold one. While we can simply intuit the existence of conceptual representations, behavioral evidence for the existence of such representations comes from conceptual priming. Specifically, exposure to a concept can facilitate the subsequent processing of that same conceptual information, even when the repeated concept is presented in a different modality than the cue (Bassili, Smith, & MacLeod, 1989; Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 1985; McClelland & Pring, 1991) . Thus, the facilitation in response times observed during conceptual priming is not dependent on the repetition of the perceptual aspects of the presented stimuli, but rather on the conceptual similarity between the two presentations. While conceptual priming has long been appreciated, the nature of the neural representation of conceptual information remains elusive.
There is emerging evidence that the perirhinal cortex (PRc), a brain region in the anterior portion of the medial temporal lobes, may contribute to the representation of conceptual information. Recent electrophysiological recordings in rodents demonstrate that the PRc has unique physiological properties that allow for the association of spatially disparate signals from multiple sensory cortices (Unal, Apergis-Schoute, & Pare, 2012). Furthermore, it is known that PRc receives auditory, visual and somatosensory unimodal inputs (Jones & Powell, 1970; Suzuki & Amaral, 1994) , as well as polymodal cortical afferent projections from orbitofrontal cortex, dorsal superior temporal sulcus, cingulate cortex and posterior parahippocampal cortex (Suzuki & Amaral, 1994) . Thus, existing anatomical and physiological data suggests that PRc can support the convergence and integration of featural representations that may contribute, at least in part, to a coherent conceptual representation.
To date, a few fMRI studies have reported results consistent with a role of the PRc in representing conceptual information. Taylor, Moss, Stamatakis, and Tyler (2006) found that PRc activation was sensitive to the congruency of two presented stimuli. Specifically, PRc activation was greater when a presented picture and sound were drawn from two different concepts (i.e. were incongruent) than when they were congruent (e.g. hearing a bark while seeing a picture of a dog). One interpretation of this finding 
